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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND NLRB DEFERRAL TO
THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: A PROPOSALt
DOUGLAS E. RAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act,' set forth in section 1 of the Act,
provides that it is the policy of the United States to aid commerce by:
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-orga-
nization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.2
Section 10 of the Acts empowers the National Labor Relations Board 4 (the Board)
to prevent any person from engaging in unfair labor practices which interfere with these
rights and to make findings, issue orders, and petition for enforcement of such orders
in court. 5 In apparent disregard of the Act's clearly stated purpose, the National Labor
Relations Board, in 1984, issued two opinions that seem to undercut Congress's attempt
to protect employee rights. These cases, United Technologies Corp.' and Olin Corp.,' involve
the Board's policy of deferring to'the private labor arbitration process and affect the
tCopyright OD 1987 Boston College Law School.
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law; B.A., University of Minnesota; J.1)„
Harvard Law School.
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1982)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982),
The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "Board" or "NLRB") is an adjudicative body
heading the federal agency bearing the same name. Section 3(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, provides that the National Labor Relations Board shall consist of five members
"appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
(1982).
5 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)—(i) (1982).
6 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 115 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1984).
7 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1984).
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rights of the millions of persons represented by unions and covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements."
Deferral is a process which can occur both before and after private labor arbitration
arising under a collective bargaining agreement. Under pre-arbitration deferral, the
Board postpones consideration of an unfair labor practice charge filed with the NLRB
by an employee or union pending the outcome of private grievance arbitration. Post-
arbitration deferral is a term which refers to the degree of deference, if any, the Board
will give the private arbitrator's award iii finally resolving the unfair labor practice charge.
In United Technologies, the Board expanded the scope of pre-arbitration deferral in
ruling that even in cases where an employee files a charge alleging a violation of
individual rights, it would withhold its jurisdiction pending arbitration under a labor
agreement if one exists.'' Furthermore, it held that an employee or union could not
generally choose to forego arbitration in order to have his or her claim heard immediately
before the Board.") United Technologies substantially increases the importance of the
standards the Board uses in determining whether a completed arbitration proceeding
has adequately protected employee rights because it expands the number and type of
arbitration awards where post-arbitration deferral is possible.
Olin Corp. substantially broadened the scope of post-arbitration deferral and made
three significant modifications of the standards for determining whether the Board
independently will exercise its jurisdiction or defer to an arbitration decision. First, Olin
Corp. overruled Board precedent reserving deferrals for cases in which the arbitrator
actually considered a statutory issue." Second, and equally important, Olin Corp. placed
the burden of proof on the party opposing deferral," a burden that sometimes is
impossible to meet under the Olin Corp. standards.' 3 Finally, the Olin Corp. Board held
that it will defer to an arbitration outcome as long as the award is not "palpably wrong." 14
Thus, even an award that is inconsistent with Board precedent is subject to deferral."
As demonstrated by the 1985 case of Ryder Truth Lines,' 0 deferral under the Olin
Corp. theory can substantially undercut individual employee rights. In Ryder, an admin-
istrative law judge of the National Labor Relations Board found that Mr. Taylor, a truck
driver with twenty-six years' seniority, was unlawfully discharged by his employer for
8
 The Board's changing policies for deferring to the process of labor arbitration by withholding
an investigation pending the outcome of labor arbitration and deferring to the actual decision of a
labor arbitrator are related historically in C. MOItItIS, THE DEVELOPING LAwoR LAw.914-9 l (2d ed.
1983) (hereinafter C. Motous). Professor Charles Morris discusses United Technologies and Olin Corp.
in Morris, NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: The Arbitrator's Awesome Responsibility, 7 Itgaus. REL.
L.J. 290 (1985) (hereinafter Morris, Arbitrator's Responsibi4ty).
9
 United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1052.
'" Id. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
12 Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 575, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
13 See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
" Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
"Id. The Board now puts the burden on the General Counsel to show "that the arbitrator's
analysis is palpably wrong as a matter of law," a burden that is not met by reliance on "arguably
distinguishable Board cases." Brewery Workers Jt. Loc. Exec. Bd., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 118 at 7, 121
L.R.R.M. 1050, 1051 (1985) (Administrative Law Judge had found seniority provisions of contract
illegal because favorable only to Union-represented outside employees, but Board reversed and
deferred to arbitration award upholding provisions).
' 6
 273 N.L.R.B. 713, 118 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1985).
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refusing to drive a truck-tractor he reasonably believed to be unsafe due to a defective
steering mechanism." The collective bargaining agreement negotiated between Ryder
Truck Lines and Mr. Taylor's exclusive bargaining representative, the Teamsters Union,
permitted such reasonable refusals.'s Had there been no arbitration proceeding, the
National Labor Relations Board would have affirmed the judge's Order reinstating Mr.
Taylor with full back pay." Instead, the Board overruled the administrative law judge
who had heard the evidence and deferred to the finding of h Teamsters Grievance
Committee which had denied the grievance and refused to reinstate Mr. Taylor," The
Board deferred to the Committee's denial of Mr. Taylor's claim even though the Com-
mittee issued no written award and even though there was no evidente that the Com-
mittee had even considered facts or law relevant to the unfair labor practice charge filed
by Mr. 'Taylor."
Mr. Taylor appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which vacated
the Board's order deferring to the decision of the Grievance Committee." In so ruling,
the court held that the Olin Corp. standard "gives away too much of the Board's respon-
sibility under the NLRA" by presuming that "all arbitration proceedings confront and
decide every possible unfair labor practice issue.""
This article suggests that the Eleventh Circuit was correct and that Olin Corp. rep-
resents an abdication of the Board's statutory authority and duty to prosecute and
remedy unfair labor practices. The current deferral standards "ultimately ha'i'm both
employees and the arbitration process. This article will support these conclusions by
analogizing the limits the Supreme Court has placed on deference to arbitration in other
areas of the law," briefly tracing the history of Board deferral to arbitration," and
deScribing the application 'Of Olin Corp. and United Technologies in subsequent cases and
analyzing their impact on individual rights and the arbitration process." Finally, this
article will present methods by which the current Board's desire to accdrnmodate its
policies to labor arbitration can be reconciled with the duties impOsed on the Board by
statute,"
The article will . lcicus primarily on the Olin Corp. Board's elimination of the require-
ment that an arbitrator actually consider a statutory issue before the Board will 'defer to
an award. In addition, the article will focus on the Olin Corp. Board's institution 'of a test
which places the burden on the party opposing deferral to show either thafthe arbitration
and unfair labor practice matters are not factually parallel or that the arbitrator was 'not
" Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 713, 719 (Administrative Law Judge Decision) (here-
inafter ALP).
'" Id. at 718.
19 Complaining about safety matters which are the subject of a collective bargaining agreement
is protected activity under the Act, and reinstatement and back pay are generally ordered incases
of discharge for such activity. See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.., 465 U.S. 822, 115 L.R:R.M.
3193 (1984); Interboro Contractors, Inc„ 157 N.L.R.13. 1295, 61 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1966), 'enforced
NLRB v. Interboro Cthitractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 67 L.R,R,M. 2983 (2d Cir. 1967).
"Ryder, 273 N.L.R.B. at 713, 118 L.k.R.M. at 1093.
21 /a at 713, 118 L,R.R.M. at 1093.
22 TaylOr v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 122 1,,,R,R.M. 2084 (11th Cir. 1986).
29 Id. at 1521-22, 122 L.R.R,M, at 208849.
See infra notes 30-57 and accompanying text.
25 See 'infra notes 58-11 a and 'accompanyinglext.
26 See infra notes 114-46 and accompanying text.
'42 See infra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
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presented generally with facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice issue." This
placement of the burden of proof distorts the role and function of private labor arbi-
trators who are retained only to interpret collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore,
the standard fails to insure that the Board has an adequate factual basis to do its job of
protecting employee rights. This article proposes a test whereby the Board will defer to
the award of a labor arbitrator or arbitration panel only where it has proof that the
arbitrator or panel considered facts relevant to resolution of the unfair labor practice
charge and, in light of these facts and the record made in arbitration, it determines that
the resolution of such facts in arbitration is consistent with the Act."
II. ARBITRATION AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has not directly reviewed the standards under which the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board may defer to labor arbitration. While the Court, through
dicta, has apparently approved the notion that the Board has some discretion to defer
to the contractual arbitration process, it also has noted that important statutory rights,
such as those arising under the civil rights laws, need not be sacrificed to the private
labor arbitration process but must be protected independently by the courts.
The Court noted the Board's power to delay action pending arbitration in Carey a.
Westinghouse Corp.," a 1964 decision where the Court stated that:
By allowing the dispute to go to arbitration its fragmentation is avoided
to a substantial extent; and those conciliatory measures which Congress
deemed vital to "industrial peace" ... and which may be dispositive of the
entire dispute, are encouraged. The superior authority of the Board may be
invoked at any time. Meanwhile the therapy of arbitration is brought to bear
in a complicated and troubled area."
Similar indications that the Court would not strike down all decisions to defer appear
in more recent opinions. In a 1974 decision, William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenter's Dist.
Council," the Court noted that the Board's policy of refraining from exercising jurisdic-
tion in cases that might be both contract violations and unfair labor practices pending
voluntary contractual arbitration "harmonizes"" with Congress's concern expressed in
section 203(d) of the Act" that:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."
2' See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058. See infra notes 112, 115-18 and
accompanying text for further discussion of this standard.
29 See infra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
39 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
"I Id. at 272.
32 417 U.S. 12 (1974),
"1d. at 16-17.
94 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
"Id., cited in William E. Arnold Co., 417 U.S. at 17.
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Once agaih, in 1984, the Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc." cited the Board's
two major deferral cases, Collyer Insulated Wire" and Spielberg Mfg. Co.," for the propo-
sition that "to the extent that the factual issues raised in an unfair labor practice action
have been, or can be addressed through the grievance process, the Board may defer to
that process.""
This dicta should not be read to indicate approval of the way in which the Board
has exercised its discretion in recent cases. Rather, the concept of deferral to arbitration
need be reviewed in light of a number of Court holdings limiting employees' rights in
arbitration and indicating the limitations of the arbitration process. First, the Supreme
Court repeatedly has held that employees, as opposed to unions, have only limited rights
in labor arbitration. When a labor contract establishes a mandatory and binding grievance
procedure and gives the union the exclusive right to pursue claims on behalf of aggrieved
employees, the employee's remedy is limited to the result obtained by the union." Thus,
an aggrieved employee subject to such an agreement lacks independent standing to
initiate the grievance procedure, sue for breach of the collective bargaining agreement
or attack in court the result obtained in the arbitration process.'"
In addition, even where the union or the employer attacks the arbitrator's decision
in court, the scope of judicial review is very narrow. The Court will overturn the decision
of an arbitrator only if it does not "draw[] its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement."-' 2 This is so even when the basis for the award of the arbitrator may be
ambiguous." An employee may bring an individual action only if the union has breached
its duty of fair representation by arbitrarily refusing to process a case through to
arbitration or by doing so in a perfunctory or otherwise arbitrary manner." In such a
case, the employee may sue the employer or union, or both, but must prove that the
union breached its duty of fair representation and that the employer breached the
collective bargaining agreement." This is, however, a narrow exception.
In a second series of opinions, the Supreme Court reacted to the narrowness of
employee rights under labor contracts and the limited ability of labor arbitrators to
protect the individual rights of employees by limiting the preclusive effect of an arbitra-
tion award on employee rights when a statutory, as opposed to a contractual, right is
involved. McDonald v. City of West Branch," Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems,
w 465 U.S, 822, 115 L.R.R.M. 3193 (1984).
192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971), For further discussion of this case, see infra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
38 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). For further discussion of this case, see infra
notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
39 City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. at 838, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200-01.
'° See 1-lines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 91 L.R.R.M. 2481 (1976); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369 (1967).
" See, e.g., Acuff v. United Papertnakers and Paperworkers, 404 F.2d 169, 171, 69 L.R.R.M.
2828, '2829 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, 70 L.R.R.M. 3378 (1969).
42 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 46 L.R.R.M. 2423,
2425 (1960).
" Id. at 598, 46 L.R.R.M. at '2425. See also Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope
of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1980).
" Vaca, 386 U.S. at 187-8H, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2375-76.
43 /d. at 187, 64 L.R.R.M, at 2375.
4° 466 U.S. 284, 115 L.R.R.M. 3646 (1984).
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Ine., 47 and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co." hold that federal courts are not required to
give preclusive effect to arbitration awards when an aggrieved employee asserts an
independent cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983,49 the Fair Labor Standards Act," or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 ' In these three cases, the Court recognized
that, while a final arbitration award usually determines an employee's rights under the
collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator's competence and authority are limited to
interpreting collective agreements and applying "the law of the shop, not the law of the
land."52 This is true even where the employee's independent statutory cause of action
arises from the same conduct and facts submitted to the grievance procedure.
These decisions manifest the Supreme Court's position that "in instituting an action
under (the statutes], the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision.
Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process."" The
Court further has concluded that "Congress intended the statutes at issue ... to be
judicially enforceable and that arbitration could not provide an adequate substitute for
judicial proceedings in adjudicating claims under those statutes." 54 The Court identified
at least four factors that support this conclusion. First, an arbitrator, schooled primarily
in the law of shop, may lack the expertise to resolve complex statutory questions."
Second, "because an arbitrator's authority derives solely from the contract, . an arbi-
trator may not have the authority to enforce" statutes." Third, the interests of the union
which generally control the grievance process are not necessarily identical to those of its
employees and the union may not adequately protect their statutory rights;" and fourth,
"arbitral factfinding is generally not equivalent to judicial factfinding." 58 Thus, while the
Court's dicta recognizes the Board's discretion to defer to a labor arbitrator's decision,
in light of the concerns expressed in McDonald, Barrenline, and Gardner-Denver, the Board
should carefully limit deferral to cases where arbitration is indeed "an adequate substi-
tute."59
BACKGROUND: THE NLRB AND ARBITRATION
Unquestionably, the National Labor Relations Board's power in unfair labor practice
cases is superior to and independent of the arbitration process even where an arbitration
case involves issues that may arise in an unfair labor practice proceeding. Section I 0(a)
of the Act makes this clear, stating that the Board's power "to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice ... shall not be affected by any other means or
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or
" 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
" 415 U.S. 36, 7 FEP Cases 81 (1974).
49 McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3648. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
5°
 Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745. See also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 51, 7 FEP Cases at 86. See also Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-1-2000e-17 (1982).
52 Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 57, 7 FEP Cases at 89.
" Id. at 54, 7 FEP Cases at 88.
" McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3648.
55 Id. at 290, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3648.
" Id.
" Id. at 291, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3648.
55 Id.
" McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3648.
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otherwise." 6° A number of decisions in the last thirty years indicate the situations in
which the Board is willing to defer to the arbitration process. These decisions have
developed what is now called the deferral doctrine.
The cases developing the deferral doctrine deal with two separate areas of Board
deferral to the arbitration process. The first, pre-arbitration deferral, refers to the
Board's policy of withholding its jurisdiction pending the outcome of grievance and
arbitration procedures. In essence, the Board postpones consideration of unfair labor
practice charges until completion of the arbitration process. The second, post-arbitration
deferral, which will be the primary focus of this article, deals with the degree of defer-
ence, if any, the Board will give to a prior arbitration award in resolving unfair labor
practice charges that arguably involve facts parallel to those litigated in the arbitration
process."'
A. Pre-Arbitration Deferral
To understand how the Board defers'to the findings of labor arbitrators, it is first
necessary to understand that the Board sometimes awaits the conclusion of labor arbi-
tration before acting. The greater the number of cases in which the Board temporarily
withholds its jurisdiction, the more important will be the standards governing the weight
given to the findings of arbitrators when the Board finally reviews these cases. In a 1963
decision, Dubo Manufacturing Corp., 62 the Board held that it would defer action on an
unfair labor practice charge pending the outcome of grievance arbitration if the matter
was already being dealt with in the grievance arbitration procedures."' In Collyer Insulated
Wire,'" a refusal to bargain case, the Board extended the deferral doctrine to include
cases where neither party had yet invoked the grievance arbitration procedures of the
contract (1) if the dispute arose within "a long and productive collective bargaining
relationship""" where the employer is not claimed to be in enmity to the employees'
exercise of rights; (2) where the employer is willing to resort to arbitration under a
clause broad enough to reach the dispute in question; and (3) where the contract and
its meaning lie at the center of the dispute.""
In a controversial 1972 decision, National Radio Co.,67 the Board extended Collyer
deferral to charges alleging restraint and coercion of and discrimination toward individ-
uals in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) 6" and 8(a)(3)69 of the Act." Although National Radio
"I 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1982).
6 ' See infra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
62 142 N.L.R,B, 431, 53 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1963).
64 Id. at 432-33, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1070.
" 192 N,L.R,B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
6' Id. at 842, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936.
66 Id.
67 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972), For a thoughtful criticism of National Radio and
the broad deferral principles for which it stands, see Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case af
Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57, 72-74 (1973).
66 29 U.S.G. § 158(a) (1) (1982). Section 8(a) (1) provides that employers may not "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [protected] rights." Id.
69 29 U.S.G. 158(a) (3) (1982). Section 8(a) (3) provides in relevant part that employers may
not "discrimina[e] in regard to hiring or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." Id.
" National Radio, 198 N.L,R,B. at 531, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722,
8	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 28:1
involved a statutory issue, the majority determined that the arbitration procedure could
resolve the dispute consistent with Spielberg-71 due to the Board's heavy caseload and the
arbitrators' experience in resolving discharges and discipline issues under labor contracts.
The Board also stated that its decision would aid in "fostering both the collective rela-
tionship and the federal policy favoring voluntary arbitration and dispute settlement.""
In early 1977, the Board overruled National Radio in General American Transportation
Corp.," limiting Collyer pre-arbitral deferral to failure-to-bargain cases alleging violations
of Sections 8(a)(5)74 and 8(6)(3). 75 The decisive vote was that of Chairman Murphy, who
stated that issues involving Sections 8(a)(1), 78 8(a)(3)," 8(b)(1)(A),79 and 8(b)(2)" are
different from cases involving alleged refusals to bargain." She explained that in cases
alleging violations of the duty to bargain in good faith based on alleged violations of the
contract:
[t]he principal issue is whether the complained-of conduct is permitted
by the parties' contract. Such issues are eminently suited to the arbitral
process, and resolution of the contract issue by an arbitrator will, as a rule,
dispose of the unfair labor practice issue. On the other hand, in cases alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(I), (a)(3), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(2), although arguably
also involving contract violation, the determinative issue is not whether the
conduct is permitted by the contract, but whether the conduct was unlawfully
motivated or whether it otherwise interfered with, restrained, or coerced
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act. In these situations, an arbitrator's resolution of the contract issue will
not dispose of the unfair labor practice allegation. Nor is the arbitration
process suited for resolving employee complaints of discrimination under
Section 7. 81
The same day the Board, decided General American, Chairman Murphy provided the
decisive vote in Ray Robinson, Inc.," reaffirming the application of Collyer deferral in
refusal-to-bargain cases because they are "particularly suited to the arbitral process." 85
7 ' Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1081, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. For further discussion of Spielberg, see
infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
' 2 National Radio, 198 N.L.R.B. at 531, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722.
"228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 n.7, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483, 1486 n.7 (1977).
"4 29 U.S:C. § 158(a) (5) (1982). Section 8(a) (5) imposes on an employer the duty "to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees." Id.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1982). Section 8(b) (3) imposes on a union the duty "to bargain
collectively with an employer." Id. See General American, 228 N.L.R.B. at 810-11, 94 L.R.R.M. at
1486 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
74 29 U.S.C. § I58(a) (1) (1982). See supra note 69.
" 29 U.S.C. § I58(a) (3). See supra note 70.
'4 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1982). Section 8(b) (1) (A) provides that labor organizations may
not "restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of [their] rights." Id.
Ill
	
U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1982). Section 8 (b) (2) provides that labor organizations shall not
"cause an employer to discriminate [illegally] against an employee." Id.
e° General American, 228 N.L.R.B. at 810-11, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486 (Murphy, Chairman, con-
curring).
81 Id., 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486-87 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
82 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1977).
es Id, at 831, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1477 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
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Finally, in 1984, the Board announced its United Technologies" decision overruling
General American. United Technologies involved allegations that a foreman had threatened
an employee with disciplinary action if she persisted in processing a grievance. The
alleged action constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1). 88 The administrative law judge,
relying on General American, refused to defer the exercise of Board jurisdiction to the
grievance arbitration machinery and found merit in the charge." The Board majority
found that the judge should not have exercised jurisdiction and overruled General
American, holding that the judge should have deferred the case pending completion of
the grievance arbitration process. 87 While the union had filed a grievance over the
incident in question, it had withdrawn the grievance at the third step of the grievance
procedure "without prejudice""" and refused the employer's request that the matter be
submitted to arbitration." Thus, the Board left the employee with no recourse; the
union was not processing her grievance, and the Board would not proceed.
In returning to the standards of National Radio, the United Technologies Board ruled
that deferral would be appropriate once again in cases alleging violations of Sections
8(a)(1) and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2). 9° Under United Technologies, "[w]hen a labor
organization seeks instead to have (the Board) resolve each dispute, we think it proper
to require it, before invoking our services, initially to invoke the available voluntary
machinery." 91 Thus, applying United Technologies, the Board now holds that employees
who allege violation of individual rights under the National Labor Relations Act must
first litigate their case in the forum designated by their contract when the contract calls
for arbitration." Because this decision causes the Board to withhold its jurisdiction in a
substantial number of cases pending arbitration," the standards under which the Board
" 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 115 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1984).
33 Id. Processing grievances is activity protected under section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1982), or section 8(a) (1), id. § 158(a) (1). See 1 C. Moms, supra note 8, at 148-49.
" United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. at 568-69 (ALJD).
87 1d. at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1052.
81, 1d. at 557, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1049-50.
89 Id., 115 L.R.R.M. at 1050.
" Id. at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1052. See also id. at 561, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1052-53 (Zimmerman,
Member, dissenting),
91 Id. at 559, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1051 (quoting United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B. 879, 880
(1973)).
92 Id. at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1052. United Technologies apparently is applied even where
arbitration is not clearly available. In United Beef Co., Roberto Rodriguez, a union shop steward,
was discharged July 13, 1983. 272 N.L.R.B. 66, 66, 117 L.R.R.M. 1203, 1204 (1984). He filed a
charge with the Board alleging that his employer had harassed him with vulgar language and
personal vilification when he was processing grievances under the parties' collective bargaining
agreement and had discharged him because of his protected activity. Id. Had there not been a
collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause, the Board would have investigated and
prosecuted the claim it' it were found to be meritorious because processing grievances as a steward
is protected activity under the Act. Instead, the Board refused to act and applied United Technologies
in holding that Rodriguez was limited to arbitration of his claim even though union counsel had
advised the Board that the union would not be processing Mr. Rodriguez' claim through to
arbitration. Id. at 68, 117 L.R.R.M. at 1205
93 The majority opinion in General American Transportation Corp. noted that from May 1973
through December 1975, 1,632 cases were deferred under Collyer. 228 N.L.R.B. at 810, 94 L.R.R.M.
at 1485-86. During the same period, 80,152 violation cases were filed with the Board. Id. Member
Zimmerman's dissent in Olin Corp. indicated that from October 1981 through December 1983, over
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will determine whether to defer to the ultimate arbitration award take on new impor-
tance.
B. Post-Arbitration Deferral
The development of the standards for determining whether to defer to an already
decided arbitration award began in 1955 with Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 94 Spielberg
involved an arbitration decision upholding the employer's discharge of four strikers
accused of picket-line misconduct. The discharged employees filed an unfair labor
practice charge after the arbitration panel denied their reinstatement." In deciding to
defer to the arbitration award, the Board established a three-part test: (I) did the
arbitration proceedings "appear to have been fair and regular"; (2) have all parties to
the arbitration proceedings "agreed to be bound"; and (3) is the decision of the arbitrator
or panel "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."" A fourth part to
the test, inquiring whether the issue involved in the unfair labor practice case had been
presented to and considered by the arbitrator, was added in the Board's 1963 decision
in Raytheon Co. 97 Yourga Trucking98 added an important, procedural corollary to the
Spielberg decision by requiring the party seeking deferral to prove that the statutory issue
was presented in the arbitration."
The Board generally applied this four-part test until 1974 when, in Electronic Re-
production Service Corp.,m° it eliminated the Raytheon requirement for deferral in discipline
and discharge cases. The Board announced that, absent unusual circumstances, it would
defer under Spielberg to arbitration awards dealing with discharge or discipline cases
regardless of the arbitrator's consideration of the unfair labor practice issue involved.
The Board also indicated that it would generally presume that the arbitrator had con-
sidered the issue of whether the discharge or discipline of the grievant was for pretextual
reasons.'" This decision received substantial criticism.'"
In 1980, the Board overruled Electronic Reproduction and returned to the original
standards of Spielberg, Raytheon, and Yourga Trucking in Suburban Motor Freight, inc.'"
Suburban Motor Freight concerned an employee who was discharged on two occasions but
reinstated both times with reduced punishment pursuant to Joint Grievance Committee
arbitral decisions.'" Because it was undisputed that the unfair labor practice issue was
3,800 cases were deferred under Collyer and Dubo. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 581, 115 L.R.R.M.
1056, 1064 (1984) (Zimmerman, member, dissenting).
94 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
n Id. at 1081, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
96 Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
97 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 887, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129, 1131 (1963), enforcement denied on other grounds,
326 F.2d 471, 55 L.R.R.M. 2101 (1st Cir. 1964).
98 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972).
" Id., 80 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
00
 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974).
mt Id. at 762, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1216.
"2 See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538, 94 L.R.R.M. 3224, 3228 (1977) (rejecting
Electronic Production rule); Simon-Rose, Deferral under Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(1)(3) Cases, 27
LAa. L.J. 201, 209-12 (1976); Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of
Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 909 (1975).
in 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 146, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1114 (1980).
' Id.
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not presented in either of the two arbitration decisions,to the Board refused to defer,
stating:
The Board can no longer adhere to a doctrine which forces employees
in arbitration proceedings to seek simultaneous vindication of private con-
tractual rights and public statutory rights, or risk waiving the latter. Accord-
ingly, we hereby expressly overrule Electronic Reproduction and return to the
standard for deferral which existed prior to that decision. In specific terms,
we will no longer honor the results of an arbitration proceeding under
Spielberg unless the unfair labor practice issue before the Board was both
presented to and considered by the arbitrator. In accord with the rule for-
merly stated in Airco Industrial Gases, we will give no deference to an arbitra-
tion award which bears no indication that the arbitrator ruled on the statutory
issue of discrimination in determining the propriety of an employer's disci-
plinary actions. In like accord with the corollary rule stated in Yourga Truck-
ing, we shall impose on the party seeking Board deferral to an arbitration
award the burden to prove that the issue of discrimination was litigated
before the arbitrator. 100
Two years later, in Propoco, Inc., 147 a case involving the discharge of a cleaning service
employee allegedly for refusing to apologize for writing a complaint letter signed by
nine other employees, the Board affirmed and strengthened the Suburban Motor Freight
doctrine. 108 In Propoco, the Board refused to defer to an arbitration award, finding a
discharge to have been for just cause, even though the arbitrator specifically had found
that the grievant was not discharged for union or other protected activity.mg The Board
majority found that the arbitrator's conclusion was unwarranted because the unfair labor
practice issue had neither been presented to nor considered by the arbitrator. The Board
also declared that an employee may choose to limit his or her arbitration case to non-
statutory issues and thereby preserve his or her right to raise statutory issues with the
Board. 110
Finally, in 1984, the Board overruled Suburban Motor Freight and Propoco in Olin
Corp.'' Olin Corp. involved the discharge of Salvatore Spatorico, a union president who
participated in a "sick out" in which 43 employees left work early with medical excuses.
Thirty-nine were given formal written reprimands and the union president was dis-
charged." 2 The discharge was grieved and arbitrated. The arbitrator upheld the dis-
charge, finding that Spatorico violated an article of the collective bargaining agreement
which imposed on union officers an affirmative duty to prevent and resist strikes in
violation of the contract and to try to stop them when they occur. With regard to the
unfair labor practice charge filed, the administrative law judge declined to defer because
he found that while the arbitrator had mentioned the unfair labor practice charge, he
m5 Id.
'mid. at 146-47, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114 (footnote omitted).
1 " 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 110 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1982), affirmed NLRB v. Porter, 742 F.2d 1438 (2d
Cir. 1983).
'°8 1d. at 137, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
mg Id. at 136, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1497.
"c' Id. at 137, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1498.
" 1 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1984).
"2 /d., 115 L.R.R.M. at 1057.
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did not consider it in "a serious way." 113 The judge then heard the case and dismissed
the complaint on the merits, finding that Spatorico, as a union officer, could be dis-
charged under Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB." 4
The Olin Corp. Board majority held that the administrative law judge should have
dismissed the case before reaching the merits and that deferral to the arbitrator's award
was appropriate." 5 The Board then announced a further modification to Spielberg, a
new standard for deferral to arbitration awards, stating:
We would find that an arbitrator has adequately considered the unfair labor
practice if (I) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor
practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts
relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice. In this respect, differences, if
any, between the contractual and statutory standards of review should be
weighed by the Board as part of its determination under the Spielberg stan-
dards of whether an award is "clearly repugnant" to the Act. And, with
regard to the inquiry into the "clearly repugnant" standard, we would not
require an arbitrator's award to be totally consistent with Board precedent.
Unless the award is "palpably wrong," i.e., unless the arbitrator's decision is
not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, we will defer.
Finally, we would require that the party seeking to have the Board reject
deferral and consider the merits of a given case show that the above standards
for deferral have not been met. Thus, the party seeking to have the Board
ignore the determination of an arbitrator has the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating the defects in the arbitral process or award." 6
Cases following Olin Corp. suggest that these standards do not guarantee that arbitration
is, in any particular case, an "adequate substitute"" 7 for adjudication before the National
Labor Relations Board.
IV. THE PROGENY OF OLIN CORP.: AN ANALYSIS
An analysis of the cases following Olin Corp. glaringly demonstrates the weaknesses
of the doctrines presented in that decision. The standard for determining whether an
arbitrator has considered a statutory issue and the placement of the burden of proof
regarding this standard on the party opposing deferral make it virtually impossible, in
many cases, to guarantee that an arbitrator's award has protected statutory rights. In
addition, the failure to distinguish between different types of arbitration proceedings
fails to recognize that not allarbitration procedures provide the gUarantee of a neutral,
detached, and professional arbitrator. Finally, the new standard of refusing to defer only
if an arbitrator's decision is "palpably wrong" can water down and eliminate important
employee rights.
First, there is no guarantee under Olin Corp. that the arbitrator has considered
material relevant to the unfair labor practice charge. The two alleged safeguards to Olin
IJS
114 Id. (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 603, 112 L.R.R.M. 3265 (1983)).
113 Olin Corp.. 268 N.L.R.B. at 576-77, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1060.
116 Id. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058 (footnotes omitted).
" 7 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
lo See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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Corp. deferral, that the contractual issue be "factually parallel" 19 and that the "arbitrator
was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice,"'"
are totally undercut by placing the burden of proof on the party opposing deferral.
Because of the limited record accompanying many arbitration decisions, this shift of the
burden means that the Board often will have no opportunity to determine whether an
arbitration award adequately protects employee rights. While the Board talks of situations
being "factually parallel," it cannot always determine whether the arbitrator had adequate
facts to resolve an unfair labor practice issue. Equally important, the Board cannot
always exercise its statutory authority to ensure that any award is not "repugnant to the
Act" under the limitations of Spielberg.' 2 ' It cannot make this determination because it
may know nothing about the arbitrator's factual basis and reasoning. Instead, it may
have before it only an unexplained award. The Board's inability to perform reliably its
statutory task under Olin Corp. becomes even more important when one realizes that
Olin Corp. has the greatest impact at the NLRB's Regional Office level where the Board
makes decisions to prosecute. Decisions not to prosecute based on Olin Corp. can deny
employees their right to a hearing on otherwise meritorious unfair labor practice
charges.'n
The decision in Yellow Freight' 25 demonstrates the weakness of the Olin Corp. burden
of proof requirement. In that case, Fred Foster, a truck driver, was discharged for
refusing to operate a truck he believed to be unsafe because of defective brakes.' 24 Mr.
Foster and a number of other drivers had complained about the truck in question and
a prior terminal manager had agreed not to use the truck. A new terminal manager
ordered Mr. Foster to drive the truck. After he had driven six miles, Foster called the
dispatcher to complain about the brakes. The manager told him he would be treated as
a "voluntary quit" if he did not proceed. Foster refused and subsequently was discharged.
Although the collective bargaining agreement permitted a driver to refuse to operate
unsafe equipment, an arbitration panel, after a two-hour hearing, upheld the termina-
tion. Shortly after the hearing, the panel issued a two-sentence award which provided:
"Based on the facts presented and the testimony submitted, the case of the Union is
denied. The discharge of Mr. Fred Foster was for just cause."'"
An unfair labor practice charge was filed and a hearing held.'" The Board decided
Olin Corp. shortly after an administrative laW judge held a hearing on the alleged unfair
labor practice in Yellow Freight.'" The General Counsel moved to withdraw the complaint
Olin Corp., 268 N.L,R,B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
1" Id.
121 See Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. See supra notes 95-96 and accom-
panying text.
122 The vast majority of deferral decisions are made in the regional offices of the NLRB. While
it is occasionally possible for a union to persuade the General Counsel through the Office of Appeals
to reverse the region's decision not to prosecute, see U.S. Postal Service, 275 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 119
L.R.R.M. 1153 (1985), the General Counsel generally has "unreviewable discretion to refuse to
institute an'unfair labor practice complaint." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2373.
121 273 N.L.R.B. 44, 118 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1984).
124
 Id. at 45, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1010-11.
123 Id,
122 Id. at 44, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
127 See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056.
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in light of Olin Gorp.' 28 The judge, affirmed by a majority of the Board panel reviewing
the case, read Olin Corp. to require that the case be dismissed. 129
Because there was no record, however, the Yellow Freight Board could not possibly
determine whether the process given Foster was an "adequate substitute" for normal
Board procedure or whether the substance of the arbitral decision was "repugnant to
the Act." By shifting the burden of proof to the party challenging deferral under the
Olin Corp. doctrine, the Yellow Freight Board allowed a decision to stand which determined
an employee's statutory rights yet which was not supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, the Board could not have adequately safeguarded the employee's rights as re-
quired by section 10(a) of the Act.'"
Ryder Truck Lines's' further demonstrates the risks inherent in decision-making based
on an inadequate or non-existent record. There, the Board deferred to the determination
of a Grievance Committee that truckdriver Melvin Taylor could be discharged under a
collective bargaining agreement despite the lack of a written award or proof that the
Committee even considered facts relevant to resolution of the charge of discrimination. 132
The Board somehow considered this determination more reliable than two separate
decisions by an administrative law judge who heard the evidence and evaluated the
facts.'"
The recent case of Martin Redi-Mix's4 demonstrates the flaw of shifting the burden
of proof to the party opposing deferral. In Martin, the employer argued successfully to
the arbitrator that an employee voluntarily had quit his job,'" and the General Counsel
introduced the arbitrator's award to show that facts relevant to the unfair labor practice
charge were absent from the record.'" An administrative law judge twice refused to
defer, once before and once after the Olin Corp. decision, and, instead, heard the
evidence.'" The administrative law judge found that deferral was not appropriate be-
cause the arbitrator was not presented with facts relevant to the unfair labor practice
and because the award was palpably wrong." Despite these findings, the Board over-
turned the judge's finding of discriminatory discharge and deferred to the arbitrator's
decision upholding the discharge.'" The Board reasoned that, under Olin Corp., the
125 See Yellow Freight, 273 N.L.R.B. at 44, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1010-11.
"9 1d. at 45, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1010-11.
' 3° 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1982).
' 3 ' 273 N.L.R.B. 713, 118 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1985). See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
' 33 Ryder Truth Lines, 273 N.L.R.B. at 713, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1093.
i" See id., 118 L.R.R.M. at 1092-93. The administrative law judge's fact findings were different
from the facts on which the arbitrator based his decision. See Ryder Truck Lines at 715-17 (ALJD).
This case demonstrates that arbitrations do not always effectively meet the employees' need for
representation in NLRA matters. The Union was not represented by counsel and may well have
done a less thorough job than did the attorney representing the General Counsel of the NLRB in
the unfair labor practice proceeding.
' 34 274 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 118 L.R.R.M. 1425 (1985).
135 Martin Redi-Mix, No. 7—CA-18563, slip op. at 4 (ALJD, Supplemental Decision, May 18,
1984).
' 3" Martin Redi-Mix, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 79 at 3-4, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1426.
'" Martin Redi-Mix, No. 7—CA-18563, slip op. at I, 4 (ALJD, Supplemental Decision, May 18,
1984) (referring to initial decision of March 31, 1982).
,38
 Id. at 4-5, 6.
' 39
 Martin Redi-Mix, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 79 at 6, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1426.
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General Counsel must show that no facts relevant to the unfair labor practice were
presented at any time in the hearing, a burden which was not met by merely introducing
the decision of the arbitrator.'"
In effect, then, the Board merely assumed that the arbitrator heard the relevant
evidence. Thus, the rule of Olin Corp. unreasonably substitutes conjecture about what
an arbitrator heard for proof. Further, the rule puts the burden of proving the absence
of evidence on the one party not present at the hearing where such evidence was allegedly
not presented. For this reason alone, the rule of Olin Corp. is unworkable.
Further, the Olin Corp. deferral standards fail to distinguish between different types
of labor arbitration. Some arbitration forums, particularly those comprised of manage-
ment and union representatives, are less suited to protecting individual rights than is
the traditional neutral arbitrator. As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted
in Taylor v. NLRB, 141 "[t]he new standard further ignores the practical reality of many
bipartite proceedings, in which individual rights may be negotiated away in the interest
of the collective good."142
The recent case of Sachs Electric Company demonstrates the correctness of this ob-
servation.'" In Sachs, Joseph Verlin, acting on his authority as union steward, spoke out
to the general foreman on behalf of other employees.'" In late January, he complained
about allocation of overtime.'" On February 3, the general foreman was instructed to
lay off one of three individuals due to a lack of work.' 46 The foreman selected Verlin
for layoff, allegedly because he was less efficient than the other two,' 47 even though
Verlin's work had never been criticized and, indeed, Verlin had been asked in the past
to help correct the work of the other two considered for layoff.'" The administrative
law judge found that when the general foreman advised Verlin of his layoff, he said,
"D-day, buddy, we are even." 14 '1- The administrative law judge thus found that Verlin
had been laid off for his protected and concerted activities on behalf of other employees
and ordered him reinstated with full back pay.' 5°
The Board reversed and, under Olin Corp., deferred to the conclusion of a Labor
Management Committee, comprised of equal numbers of union and management rep-
' 41i Id. at 3-4, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1426.
141 786 F.2d 1516, 122 L.R.R.M. 2084 (1 lth Cir. 1986).
112 Id. at 1522, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2089. The court cites Summers, The Teamster Grievance Commit-
tees: Grievance Disposal Without Adjudication, 37 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF AIM. 130 (1984),
reprinted in 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 313 (1985) as a survey demonstrating the inadequacy of some grievance
committee proceedings which may involve only 15-minute hearings lacking relevant facts. Taylor,
786 F.2d at 1522 & n.8, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2089 & n.8. A permanent arbitrator, too, may sometimes
have a general interest in serving the parties that nominated him or her; the arbitrator's interest
thus conflicts with the interest of the individual employee grievants whose rights are at stake. See
Donald Brown d/b/a Bailey Distributors, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 121 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1986) (Dennis,
Member, dissenting).
" 2 278 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 1, 121 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1986).
144 Id.
" 5 Id. at 2-3, 121 L.R.R.M. at 1269.
"6 /d. at 2, .121 L.R.R.M. at 1269.
'" Id.
148 See Sachs Electric Co., No. GR-7—CA-23230, slip op. at 4 (ALJD, 1984).
149 Id. at 3.
'so Id. at 4.
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resentatives, which had concluded that the layoff was not improper because Verlin was
not a steward when laid off. 15 ' The contract provided that stewards shall be the last laid
off and shall not be discriminated against because of performing their duties as stewards.
This provision formed the basis of the grievance.'" The administrative law judge, in
refusing to defer to the award, noted that the Union representatives agreed with the
company representatives because the Union had failed to properly notify the company
in writing that Verlin was a steward.'" The Board majority failed to adopt this finding
and deferred to the committee's decision that the discharge was proper. 15'
The decision in Sacks Electric does not pass muster either under the Olin Corp.
"factually parallel" test. 155
 or under the broad principles underlying Olin Corp. The
National Labor Relations Act protects employees who assert the contractual rights of
others.'" A joint labor management committee is not an adequate substitute for an
administrative law judge because, as occurred in Sachs Electric, union-management bar-
gaining interests can outweigh the rights of the individual. As Professor Summers has
argued, the joint grievance committee process "is structured to allow ex parte evidence,
reliance on irrelevant considerations, grievance trading, political motivations, and per-
sonal bias."ts'r
Finally, the Olin Corp. deferral also may water down or eliminate employee rights
where arbitrators have ordered remedies less complete than would the Board. For
example, in Cone Mills,'" Marie Darr, an elected union steward, was discharged in
November, 1977, for protesting changes in break scheduling. Both an arbitrator and an
administrative law judge of the National Labor Relations Board found that Ms. Darr's
discharge violated the National Labor Relations Act because it was motivated by her
engaging in a protected activity. The administrative law judge ordered reinstatement
and back pay.'" Despite the propriety of the underlying finding of illegal motivation,
the Board overruled the administrative law judge and deferred to the award of the
arbitrator granting reinstatement but no back pay for the more than nine months Ms.
Darr was improperly out of work. 160
 Had there been no arbitration award, there is no
question that under Board policies, she would have received full back pay under the
Act. 1 e'
1" Sachs, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 121 at 4, 121 L.R.R.M. at 1270.
152
 Sachs, No. GR-7—CA-23230, slip op. at 2.
153 Id. at 2-3.
1" Sachs, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 121 at 4, 6, 121 L.R.R.M. at 1270-71.
1" Id. at 7, 121 L.R.R.M. at 1271.
188
 NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 115 L.R.R.M. 3193 (1984).
157 Summers, supra note 132; at 333, 7 INDus. REL. L.J. at 333.
"8
 273 N.L.R.B. 1515, 118 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1985).
159 1d. at 1516, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
m Id., 118 L.R.R.M. at 1199.
161 The Board generally has insisted on full back pay with reinstatement in areas other than
deferral to labor arbitration. See, e.g., Community Medical Servs. of Clearfield, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B.
853, 98 L.R.R.M. 1314 (1978) (refusing to accept settlement agreement of reinstatement without
back pay for persons illegally discharged). As the Board pointed out in another settlement case,
Ideal Donut Shop, "reinstatement and back pay are remedies which the Board provides in the
public interest to enforce a public right. No private right to such relief attaches to a discriminate
which he can bargain away or compromise . ..." 148 N.L.R.B. 236, 237, 56 L.R.R.M. 1486, 1487
(1964).
Regional offices and the General Counsel, after a complaint has been issued, generally refuse
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In Dan- v. NLRB, 162 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded the Cone
Mills case to the Board noting that if the Board had found what the arbitrator had
found, it would have ordered back pay as well as.reinstatement. In addition, the court
noted that the Board neither explicitly set forth a waiver theory by which a union could
waive employee rights nor did it explain how, if at all, the statutory claim merged into
the contract claim. Because the Board had not adequately "articulatfed] its view of the
interrelationship between the law of a particular collective bargaining agreement and
the NLRA," the court remanded the case to the Board "for further consideration (or
explanation) of its reasons for deferring to the arbitrator's award." 163
The Board's application of'Olin Corp. in these cases represents a too rigid adherence
to a questionable holding. While extending Suburban Motor Freight may be within the
Board's discretion,' 64 Olin Corp., as applied in these cases, is beyond the bounds of the
Board's discretion. The Board, and not the arbitrator, is charged with enforcing the
National Labor Relations Act and protecting employee rights. Where, in performing its
duties, the Board chooses to defer to the finding of another fact finder, it must insure
that those findings are based on fact and lead to a result consistent with the Act.
V. A PROPOSAL
Improved standards for deferral should reflect Congress's mandate that the National
Labor Relations Act is to be enforced by the National Labor Relations Board, and not
by private labor arbitrators. The problem is not one of selecting a standard by which
the Board should review the arbitrator's decision, because the Board is not statutorily
empowered to review or reverse a private labor arbitrator whose function it is to interpret
the collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the focus should be on whether the Board
has received enough information through the arbitration process to enable it to do its
job of determining whether the employee's statutory rights have been sufficiently pro-
tected. Thus, the test should not be whether the arbitrator had an "opportunity to
consider"' 65 the unfair labor practice charge, and a proper standard should not presume
that an arbitrator has been presented with the facts "relevant to resolving the unfair
labor practice"lo" merely because the party opposing deferral cannot prove that such
facts were not presented and allegations are "factually parallel." 107 Similarly, the test
to accept proposed settlements involving back pay claims unless the settlement offer is at least 80
percent of the maximum amount clue. Aaron, The NLRB, Labor Courts, and Industrial Tribunals: A
Selective Comparison, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 41 (1985). Regional offices encourage settlement
efforts and these effbrts have been substantially successful. In fiscal year 1981, 16.3 percent of
charges were settled or adjusted before complaints issued and 12.4 percent of cases in which
complaints issued were settled or adjusted before. issuance of an administrative law judge opinion.
Id. (citing Forty-Sixth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1981 (Washington, D.C. GPO 1983) at 10 and Table 8).
1'2 801 F.2d 1409, 123 L.R.R.M. 2548 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
' 63 /d. at 1409, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2552.
"" See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
1 "' See Electronic Reproduction, 213 N.L.R.B. at 762, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1216. For a discussion of
this case, see supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
' 6° See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058, See supra notes 108- 12 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
IP Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
18	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 28:1
should not he one which merely asks whether the arbitrator "considered" the unfair
labor practice issues.' 68
A proper test should inquire whether the Board has proof that the arbitrator or
arbitration panel considered facts relevant to resolution of the unfair labor practice
charge and, in light of these facts, whether the result was consistent with the Act. Only
with such a test, can the Board 'fulfill its statutory duties.
Under this proposed standard, not all the decisions which applied Olin Corp. would
be invalid. Olin Corp. itself, for example, involved a record of evidence from arbitration
which demonstrated reasoned application of contract to fact. The Board had relevant.
facts to review and could determine whether the arbitrator's conclusions had bases in
fact and were consistent with NLRB practice. ' 69
Similarly, the Board could continue to defer in recent cases like Stroh Brewery Com-
pany)" There, the Board applied Olin Corp. and deferred to an award upholding the
discharge despite the arbitrator's explicit disclaimer that he was not relying on the Labor
Management Relations Act.rn Not only was there a written transcript of the arbitration
hearing, but the arbitrator also made findings of fact and provided a written opinion
supporting the conclusions reached.L 72 Therefore, the Board had information allowing
it to make a decision on the labor law issues.
The second major part of this proposal is that the Board must determine whether,
in light of the facts presented to the arbitrator or panel as evidenced by the record, the
resolution of the dispute is consistent with the purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act. This is a change in wording from the Spielberg terminology of "clearly repugnant"
to the Act.' 73 The proposed standard is less deferential than the Olin corp. standard of
"palpably wrong," which was defined as a decision "not. susceptible to an interpretation
consistent with the Act." 174
Thus, the proposed standard should decrease the number of cases in which deferral
is appropriate. This change is necessary for two reasons. First, the loose Olin Corp.
standard can undercut employee rights and lead to results that the Board would not
sanction even in voluntarily settled cases. As noted above, cases like Cone Mills, where
an arbitrator has directed a remedy that is less favorable to the employee than the Board
1 " See Raytheon, 140 N.L.R.B. at 887, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1131. For a discussion of this case see
supra note 97 and accompanying text.
162 Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 585, 586 (ALJD) (indicating detail of award). See also Olin Corp.,
268 N.L.R.B. at 576 n.13, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1059 n.13 (indicating that there existed a "record" of
the arbitration proceeding).
1 " 273 N.L.R.B. 1604, 118 L.R.R.M. 1238 (1985).
171 Id. at 1606-07, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1238.
172 Stroh, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1604-05 & nn. 6-8 (ALJD). Both parties were represented by counsel
at the arbitration hearing, Id, at 1604. The existence of a detailed opinion also helps the Board
decide if an award is under current standards "clearly repugnant" to the Act or "palpably wrong."
In Garland Coal & Mining Co., the Board declined to defer to an arbitrator's award which had
reduced a discharge to a three week suspension. 276 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 120 L.R.R.M. 1159 (1985).
From the detailed opinion, the Board was able to tell that the employee had been disciplined for
protected activity and that no discipline could stand. Without a detailed opinion, the Olin Corp.
standards may well have led to deferral to the arbitration award.
172 Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
14 Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
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would have directed, are dangerous.' 76 While NLRB remedies exist for the protection
of all employees, decisions like Cone Mills warn that it is not safe to exercise protected
rights. 176 Other recent cases, such as the Board's 1985 decision in U.S. Postal Service,' 77
suggest that arbitrators as well may compromise Weingarten 178 rights to the presence of
a union representative at an investigatory interview. Arbitrators do not have the respon-
sibility of enforcing public rights under the NLRA. 179 For this reason the NLRB must
assure that the remedies and orders arbitrators impose are consistent with the Act before
deferral is appropriate.
The second reason for replacing the Olin Corp. standard is that the proposed
"consistent with the Act" standard is a necessary safeguard to maintain trust in the
Board's exercise of its discretion to defer. The Board generally makes deferral decisions
in relative secrecy at the Regional Office level. In deciding not to issue a complaint, an
officer of the NLRB needs standards by which to guide his or her action. A standard
that provides for deferral unless the result "is not susceptible to an interpretation
consistent with the Act" 169 is too loose a standard to provide guidance and must lead to
widespread deferral. This is particularly true when, as has occurred•in cases such as Cone
Mills, 1 e' the Region, General Counsel, and Administrative Law Judge all have deemed
an arbitrator's award "palpably wrong" and the Board has reversed their determina-
tion.' 62 Because the Board sets the policies which Regions, the Office of Appeals, and
the Administrative Law Judges must follow, the message of Cone Mills will not be missed
by those responsible for following Board policy.'" This is especially true if the Region
1 " See Cone Mills, 273 N.L.R.B. 1515, 118 L.R.R.M. 1197. See supra notes 128-30 and accom-
panying text.
179 A major purpose of the Board's remedies in discrimination cases is to send other employees
the message that they, too, are protected. See e.g., Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 13 L.R.R.M.
512 (3d Cir. 1943) (upholding reinstatement and back pay for discriminatorily discharged employee
despite his admitted incompetences and failure to work).
177 275 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 119 L.R.R.M. at 1153 (1985). In U.S. Postal Service, the Board deferred
to an arbitrator's award which held that the employee's Weingarten rights had not been violated. Id.
Under NLRB v. Weingarten, an employee has a right to the presence of a union representative at
an investigative interview, 420 U.S. 251, 88 L.R.R.M. 2689 (1975). The arbitrator found in U.S.
Postal Service that the employee's continued participation in the interview after having been told no
union representative was available constituted waiver of her right to union representation, 275
N.L.R.B. No. 65, 119 L.R.R.M. 1153. The employer, however, had not advised the employee that
she had a choice of either continuing the interview unrepresented or foregoing the interview. Id.
178 See NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 88 L.R.R.M. 2689 (1975).
179 As Chairman Murphy pointed out in her General American concurrence, arbitrators are not
legally qualified to decide unfair labor practice issues and these issues should instead be decided
by persons qualified by the Civil Service Commission as hearing examiners under Section 11 of the
Administrative Procedures Act, 228 N.L.R.B. at 811 n.11, 94 L.R. R. M. at 1486-87 nil (Murphy,
Chairman, concurring) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1982); N.L.R.B. Rules and Regulations and State-
ments of Procedure, Series 8, as amended §§ 101.10, 101.11, 102.35(j)).
1" Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
191 See supra notes 128-30, 158-60 and accompanying text.
In See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text,
1B3 The recent U.S. Postal Service case reached the Board only because the Board's Office of
Appeals had sustained the union's appeal of the Regional Director's decision not to issue a complaint.
275 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 119 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1985). After the decisions in U.S. Postal Service and Cone
Mills, neither Regional Directors nor the Office of Appeals are likely to refuse to defer on repug-
nancy grounds.
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is concerned about potential liability under the Equal Access to justice Act for pursuing
the matter in the face of such Board precedent.
Moreover, the above proposals should be combined with the first two tests of the
Spielberg standard to provide a standard for deferral which is more consistent with the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, under this proposal," 9 the Board
may defer to an already decided arbitration award if (1) the arbitration proceedings
"appear to have been fair and regular;" 96
 {2) all parties to the arbitration proceeding
have "agreed to be bound;" 187 (3) the award or determination is in writing and from the
award, opinion, and other evidence of what transpired at the hearing, it is clear that the
arbitrator or arbitration panel considered facts relevant to resolution of the unfair labor
practice charge; 188 and (4) in light of these facts, the resolutions of fact and the ultimate
result are consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act." 9
 The Board should
place the burden of proof that these standards have been met on the party proposing
deferra1. 19° The proposed test represents a partial overruling of Olin Corp.
While proponents of broader deferral have cited numerous supporting policies,
none of these policies supports the breadth of deferral suggested by Olin Corp. First,
supporters of broader deferral have pointed to preserving the benefits of the bargain
struck by the parties to the collective bargaining agreement and to an alleged national
policy under Section 203(d) 19 ' favoring private resolution of labor disputes.' 92 These
arguments, however, cannot support the broad deferral of Olin Corp. The parties' bargain
194
 Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, certain prevailing parties may recover attorneys' fees
and expenses if the General Counsel was not "substantially justified" in issuing the complaint. 5
U.S.C. 504 (1982) as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985).
"9 The proposal made here is that the Olin Corp. standard be changed. If it is not to be changed,
the advice of Professor Charles Morris should be followed. Professor Morris has noted that the
guidelines of Olin Corp. are based on the expectation that arbitrators will apply the law of the
National Labor Relations Act and will lead to deferral in hundreds, if not thousands, of cases, the
results of which never reach the public eye. Morris, Arbitrator's Responsibility, supra note 8, at 305.
In response, he suggests that (I) awards in deferral cases be made publicly available, (2) arbitrators
educate themselves as to NLRA issues; (3) both the Board and the parties give notice to arbitration
selecting agencies when cases involve NLRA issues so that arbitrators who do not consider themselves
qualified to rule in such cases may withdraw; and (4) standards for judicial review of arbitration
awards which treat statutory issues be changed or clarified. Id. at 305-10.
' 9° Spielberg, 1 12 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text. There is some question as to whether all Olin Corp. deferrals have been to "fair and regular" .
arbitration proceedings. .See Savin & Col., Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 120 L.R.R.M. 1287 (1985)
(Board defers to award refusing to reinstate seven unfair labor practice strikers allegedly because
of picket line violence despite fact that employer failed to present witnesses and presented only
employees' affidavits in arbitration hearing). See also supra note 132. The proposal made here would
require that deferral only take place if arbitration proceedings were genuinely fair, including regular
hearings with witnesses, the opportunity to cross-examine, and other rudimentary elements of a
traditional arbitration hearing. •
"7 Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
1911 See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
L 89 See .supra notes 156-69 and accompanying text.
199 Olin Corp. places the burden of proof on the party opposing deferral. See Olin Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
191 29 U.S.C. 173(d) (1982).
192
 See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574 n.5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1057 n.5. See also General American,
228 N.L.R.B. at 815, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1491 (Penello and Walther, Members, dissenting).
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was for arbitration of contract disputes. Section 203(d)'" must be read in light of Section
10(4 194
 which appoints the Board to enforce the Act. Further, Section 203(d) is, on its
face, limited to "grievance disputes. arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing labor agreement."'" The cases in question involve more than contract disputes.
Second, supporters of broader deferral have pointed to a reduction of the Board's
work load. 196 While this may be closest to the true reason for Board deferral, there is
no clear evidence that deferral reduces the work load.' 97 In any event, this reason alone
cannot justify denying employees their statutory protections unless there are other
safeguards to guarantee their rights. Olin Corp. offers no such safeguards.
Third, supporters have pointed to the alleged speed of arbitration as compared to
the delay involved in receiving a Board determination. 198 While arbitration is more
speedy, it too suffers from substantial delays, with the average arbitrated case requiring
approximately 230 days from grievance to award.'" 9 Further, pre-arbitration deferral,
under which the Board will defer pending the outcome of arbitration and will not even
begin its work, exacerbates Board delay. Finally, determination by arbitration or Board
proceedings does not logically have to be an either/or proposition. While an illegally
discharged employee receiving a full remedy through arbitration may have no need of
further proceedings before the Board, a person who feels that he or she did not receive
the equivalent of statutory protection befbre the arbitrator should be able to approach
the government agency charged with protecting his or her rights. Thus, the comparative
speed of arbitration ought not be a reason for delaying already slow Board proceedings.
Fourth, and related to the third point, is an expressed concern that employees may
somehow receive "two bites at the apple" by having their case heard by both an arbitrator
and the Board. 21'' It is difficult to understand why this is viewed as undercutting either
1114
 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
194 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1982). See mpra note 3 and accompanying text.
195 29 U,S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
n' See General American, 228 N.L.R.B. at 818-19, 94 L.R.R.M. at. 1494 (Penello and Walther,
Members, dissenting). See also Zimmer, Wired for Collyer: Rationalizing NLRB and Arbitration Juris-
diction, 48 INn. L.J. 141, 196 (1972).
1 "7
 Even members of the Board cannot agree as to the impact of deferral on work toad. Compare
Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 581, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1064 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting) and
General American, 228 N.L.R.B. at 810. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1485-86 with Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 575
n.9, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1058 11.9 and General American, 228 N.L.R.B. at 819 n.48, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1494
n.48 (Penello and Walther, Members, dissenting).
1" See General American, 228 N.L.R.B. at 818-19, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1494 (Pencil() and Walther,
Members dissenting). See also Schatzki, NLRB Resolution of Contract Disputes Under Section 8(a)(5), 50
TEX. L. REV. 225, 251-52 (1972).
199
 Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Thirty-Fourth Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981
Table 19, p. 39. (230.26 average days elapsed between grievance filing and award.)
2" See NLRB v. Motor Convoy, 673 F.2(1 734, 109 L.R.R.M. 3201 (4th Cir, 1982). The concept
applied by the Board seems to be that arbitration gives both parties the "benefit of their bargain"
and that they should be entitled to no more. The Board applied this rationale explicitly in Anderson
Prestress Div., a discharge case in which the Board overruled its Administrative Law Judge and
deferred to an arbitration decision upholding discharge, stating that its standard of review did not
contemplate substituting its own judgment for that of the arbitrator, 277 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 121
L. R. R. M. 1069 (1985). 111 this case, an employee refused to work in allegedly dangerous conditions,
and picketed to protest unsafe conditions and alleged unfair labor practices, all of which the
Administrative Law judge thought to be protected activities. Id. at 4, n.4, 121 L.R.R.M. at 1070
n.4. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 50 L.R.R.M. 2235 (1962). In deferring
to all award in which the Administrative Law judge made no findings of fact or written disposition,
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arbitration or the Board. Under the test proposed, if the issues are the same and the
resolution is consistent with the Act, the Board could still defer. If these standards are
not met, however, it is appropriate that the Board decide statutory issues. To do so in
no way undercuts the authority of the arbitrator to decide contract issues."' Thus, the
test proposed is consistent with the policies justifying Board deferral and better protects
individual employee rights than does the overly broad test of Olin Corp..
Further, the proposed test is more likely than Olin Corp. to survive judicial review.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the Board's decisions in the
deferral area which have applied Olin Corp. 2°2
 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
has questioned these decisions, 202
 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
limited them. 2° Further, Olin Corp. is modeled somewhat on Electronic Reproduction," 5
which was rejected by courts and received substantial criticism.206
 By contrast, a number
Anderson, 277 N.L.R.B. No. 127, at 9, 121 L.R.R.M. at 1069 (ALJD), the Anderson Board stated,
Idieferral recognizes that the parties have accepted the possibility that an arbitrator might decide
a particular set of facts differently than would the Board. This possibility, however, is one which
the parties have voluntarily assumed through collective bargaining." Id. at 5 n.6, 121 L.R.R.M. at
1070 n.6. See also Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain; A Possible Way
Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23 (1985) (favoring deferral under Olin
Corp. under a contractual waiver doctrine).
The problem with such benefit of the bargain or waiver analysis is two-fold. First, the argument
should not apply in individual rights cases because individuals have their own rights under the
statute which are not always waivable by the parties to the contract. Second, many current contracts
were negotiated before Olin Corp. Thus, the parties had no notice that by agreeing to arbitration
they were waiving rights.
20 ' Former Member Penello, dissenting in Suburban, argued that non-deferral in discharge and
discipline cases was "particularly destructive of the arbitral process" because a deferral standard
that requires the arbitrator to have "considered" the unfair labor practice would cause the union
to withhold evidence of discrimination from the arbitrator to maintain the employee's access to the
Board. 247 N.L.R.B. at 148, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1115 (Penello, Member, dissenting). Thus, an arbitrator
would not receive all the evidence needed to determine "just cause." Id. The test proposed, which
does not require that the arbitrator have "considered" the unfair labor practice issues, does not
pose this problem. Unions would need to put evidence of discrimination into the record so that the
Board could consider it in making the decision to defer.
292 See Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 122 L.R.R.M. 2084 (11th Cir. 1986). But see Garcia v.
NLRB, 785 F.2d 807, 121 L.R.R.M. 3349 (9th Cir. 1986) (court did not seem to question application
of Olin Corp. in denying enforcement of Board order where Board deferred to award that court
thought contrary to law and inconsistent with Board standards). Board decisions in the deferral
area are subject to review for abuse of discretion. See e.g., NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643
F.2d 965, 970, 106 L.R.R.M. 2729, 2732 (3d Cir. 1981).
1" See Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 123 L.R.R.M. 2548 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
1" See Nevins v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 14, 122 L.R.R.M. 3147 (2d Cir. 1986). In Nevins, the court
held that the Olin Corp. standard was not satisfied where a claim of constructive discharge for
protected activity was not raised before the arbitrator. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded
the case and labeled deferral an abuse of administrative discretion. In so ruling, the court rejected
the Board's contention that the employee had purposefully not raised the issue before the arbitrator.
Regardless whether Nevins is to blame for not 'raising the issue before the arbitrator,
however, the fact of the matter is that the Olin standard for deferral was not satisfied,
since the issue was not raised and the facts necessary to resolve the issue were not
presented to the arbitrator.
Id. at 19, 122 L.R.R.M. at 3152.
45 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. The Olin Corp. majority denies the similarity.
Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 575 n.10, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1059 n.10.
206 See supra note 102.
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of courts of appeals approved the Suburban Motor Freight decision, which was overruled
in Olin Corp."? While the test here proposed does not require that the arbitrator have
"considered" the unfair labor practice, it is generally consistent with Suburban Motor
Freight and the views of the courts, most particularly with respect to placing the burden
of proof on the party proposing deferral rather than on the party opposing deferral.!"
Furthermore, the proposed requirement that arbitration outcomes must be consistent
with the Act, rather than merely not repugnant to it, also has important implications for
court review. Courts sometimes have overruled Board decisions not to defer on the basis
of repugnancy to the Act on the grounds that where "the reasoning behind an [arbitra-
tion] award is susceptible of two interpretations," it cannot be called "clearly repug-
nant."209 The Olin Corp. standards of "palpably wrong" and "not susceptible to an inter-
pretation consistent with the Act -210 leave the Board even less discretion to refuse to
defer to an award without being vulnerable to a charge of abusing its discretion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Read together, the recent Board decisions in United Technologies and Olin Corp. have
a substantial impact on the degree to which the National Labor Relations Act protects
employees' individual rights, United Technologies substantially increases the number of
arbitration awards that will be eligible for deferral treatment. For this reason, the
standards under which deferral is approved are extremely important. Care must be
taken to insure that cases deferred under United Technologies pending arbitration are
reviewed after arbitration to insure that individual rights are protected. Recent cases
applying Olin Corp. demonstrate that the standards of Olin Corp. do not adequately
protect these rights.
Olin Corp. must be modified to insure that the Board can perhirin its statutory duty
of protecting employees. Arbitration cannot completely fulfill this duty. In their private
collective bargaining agreement, the parties may agree that the arbitrator's award is the
appropriate way to resolve their disputes. They may not, however, give the Board power
to resolve their private contractual disputes nor may they voluntarily or otherwise relieve
the Board of its public duty to carry out the policies of the Act. Public rights and public
duties ought not be waived through the private negotiation process that leads to a
collective bargaining agreement.
"7 See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnetics Intl, 699 F.2d 806, 112 L.R.R.M. 2658 (6th Cir. 1983); United
Parcel Serv. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 972, 113 L.R.R.M. 2174 (3d Cir. 1983); Pioneer Finishing Corp. v.
NLRB, 667 F.2d 199, 109 L.R.R.M. 2112 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080, 112 L.R.R.M.
3448 (1983); Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 94 L.R.R.M. 3224 (9th Cir. 1977); !lanyard v.
NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 87 L.R.R.M. 2001 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
$" See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnetics Intl, 699 F.2d at 811, 112 L.R.R.M. at 2663 ("any doubts
regarding the propriety of deferral will be resolved against the party urging deferral").
"9 See Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 354, 102 L.R.R.M. 2811, 2812-13 (9th Cir.
1979) (finding abuse of discretion under this standard where Board refused to defer to arbitration
award of reinstatement without back pay).
Olin Corp.. 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1048. See supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
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